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This chapter is about the respective influence of market forces, professional regulations 
and organizational rules on academic labor markets and work. By labor markets, are meant 
recruitment procedures, processes allocating individuals to positions and devices organizing 
career paths. Academic work refers to the contents and management of day-to-day activities 
achieved by faculty members. It is important to note that all aspects of academic work will be 
considered in this chapter, although the different components of academic activities are 
frequently studied independently: the sociology and anthropology of science focus on 
research, while the science of education analyzes teaching and pedagogical tasks. Following 
some precursory works (Bertrand 1993 or Schimank 1995), the three main dimensions of 
academic work – research, teaching, and the achievement of administrative responsibilities 
and tasks- will be taken into account. 
Academic labor markets and work are both considered in this chapter in order to exhibit 
the intricate links between them. It will be shown that the nature of the regulation which 
prevails on academic labor markets impacts on academic work and vice versa.  
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The respective influence of the market, the profession and the organization on academic 
labor markets1 or work is a rather traditional questioning. But it seems highly relevant to raise 
it once again after the recent evolution of most higher education systems and the increasing 
autonomy and empowerment of universities (among many, Braun and Merrien 1999 or 
Amaral, Jones and Karseth 2002). Most studies on the academic profession (among others 
Fulton 1994, Altbach 2000, Enders 2001) conclude that market mechanisms and managerial 
organizational devices are developing while professional regulation is threatened and 
weakened. M. Henkel in this book also comes to this conclusion when addressing the 
transformation of academic identities. This chapter is intended to take a closer look at this 
trend and assess what remains under the control of the peers. It also aims at examining 
whether academic labor markets and academic work are equally concerned by this trend. 
With this purpose, three main dimensions pertaining both to academic labor markets 
and work will be respectively examined: the division and allocation of work; control and 
incentive mechanisms, and the affiliation of academics to collective entities.  
For each of them, the respective influence of market forces, professional norms and 
organizational rules will be discussed. For instance, are decisions about recruitments 
(academic labor market) or the allocation of tasks (academic work) dependent on bureaucratic 
rules implemented by a hierarchy, on decisions made by peers, or on spot-markets ? 
Because important variations exist among countries, the analysis of the four dimensions 
under study will build on two empirical studies. The first concerns France, Germany and the 
United States: about 200 interviews were led on recruitment and career management 
(Musselin 2005) but also on the organization  and the allocation of academic work. A further 
study was led in France on the accomplishment of academic work in four disciplines (history, 
physics, biology and management) each time, in three university departments (Becquet and 
Musselin 2004).  
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Division and allocation of work 
 
Academic activities are specific. They are neither strongly formalized nor standardized. 
Based on unclear technologies (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972) they are difficult to describe, 
to prescribe, and to reproduce (Musselin 2006). They are closer to an “intellectual” craft, each 
“product” (a course, a paper, or a research project) being conducted from the beginning to the 
end by one person or by a small group frequently composed of a team leader and a few 
subordinates. As a result, the division of work is not formally structured in any of the three 
countries under study. Nevertheless some underlying mechanisms can be identified which 
have an impact on the manner in which work is allocated.  
 
Differences introduced by the segmentation of the academic labor market 
 
The first mechanism is linked to the co-existence of segmented academic labor-markets 
(Kerr 1954), primary labor markets on the one hand and secondary on the other (Doeringer 
and Piore 1971). The former include permanent staff (titulaires in France, Beamter auf Dauer 
in Germany and tenured positions in the USA), but also the American tenure track positions2 - 
being transformed into tenured positions in 7 out of 10 cases (Chait 2002) they are rather 
stable academic positions -. The timing of access to the primary labor market differs a great 
deal from one country to another: it occurs rather early in France and in the USA (academics 
in their thirties) but much later in Germany (after forty). The percentage of positions 
concerned by each segment varies a great deal as well3 but the secondary labor market tends 
to expand. In this market different types of time-limited positions are concerned: from 
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doctoral students to research fellows, adjuncts or part-time teachers. Despite the variety, the 
contrast in terms of division and allocation of work between the primary and the secondary 
labor markets is stronger than within each of them.  
On the secondary labor markets, the definition of work is more precise and there is less 
room for self-determination. First, faculty members belonging to the primary labor market 
exercise hierarchical relations on the members of the secondary labor market, and thus 
directly weigh on the contents and allocation of their work. Bilateral relationships between 
those providing work and defining the activities, and those executing these tasks are the rule. 
In Germany for instance, non-professor positions are for a limited time, assistants depend on 
professors who recruit them, define their research programs and teaching duties and act as 
their employers. Second the contents as well as the scope of work of the less secure positions 
are most of the time focused on only one aspect of academic work. Adjuncts for instance only 
have teaching assignments while post-docs are generally dedicated to research only.. As a 
result, being on the secondary labor market has an impact on the contents and the definition of 
work, and on who makes the decision.  
The decreasing share of permanent and tenure track positions in many countries 
(Altbach 2000, Enders 2001, Chait 2002, Finkelstein and Schuster 2006) should lead to an 
increasing share of staff, working on specified tasks, directly dependent on a principal, for 
time-limited periods. Recruitment processes for this category of staff are less formalized, less 
based on collective peer decisions, and rely more often on general rules of employment than 
for permanent academics. The expansion of the secondary labor markets therefore reflects a 
stronger impact of market forces on teaching and/or research staff. On the one hand, this 
increase in non-permanent positions is convergent with the overall transformations of work 
outlined for instance by P.-M. Menger (2002) who argues that wage-earners are closer today 
to workers in the arts because protected employment and life-long careers within the same 
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firm are rarer while simultaneously, projects and recognition of competences become more 
frequent. But, on the other hand, the extension of the secondary labor market in academia 
departs from this analysis because it is not accompanied by an empowerment of tasks: on the 
contrary, tasks are more closely defined and hierarchical relationships prevail.  
 
Three main factors which explains the division of work on the primary academic labor 
market 
 
The division of work within the group of permanent and tenure track positions is less 
marked than between the primary and the secondary labor-markets, but it nevertheless exists. 
Three main factors – the status, the institutional hierarchy and self-regulation - play a role in 
explaining discrepancies among permanent academics but each factor does not have the same 
weight from one place to another.  
In some countries, the division of labor vary according to the status. This is typical for 
France where permanent positions (by far the largest share of the academic profession) 
consist in two corps: young academics start as maîtres de conférences (tenured assistant 
professors) and some become professors. Because the legal rules defining each corps do not 
introduce compelling and clear differences in terms of tasks, the weight of status varies across 
departments (Becquet and Musselin 2004): in some, it plays no role and polyvalence prevails, 
while a strict interpretation of the rules is respected in others. In this last case, each corps 
concentrates on differentiated tasks and professors only are considered as completely 
autonomous. Nevertheless, the activities on which status plays a role are not the same 
according to disciplines.. In departments of physics and biology where status respect is strong, 
all kind of tasks are concerned by the status-based division of work: the maîtres de 
conférences teach section sections but no lecture courses, they have a restricted access to 
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administrative responsibilities and can not lead a research project by their own. It is not the 
case in history: administrative responsibilities and teaching are allocated according to status 
but the maîtres de conférences are completely autonomous as far as research is concerned. 
Moreover, whatever the discipline, status can impact on the division of work but never 
implies subordination: status creates prestige-related professional segments (Bucher and 
Strauss 1961) among the same academic group and but the professors do not act as the 
principals of the maîtres de conférences. 
In some other countries, on the contrary, status makes no difference, but the institutional 
hierarchy does. In American research universities, it is thus not relevant to distinguish 
between tenure track and tenured staff in order to understand how work is allocated. An 
assistant professor may teach graduate students and head a research contract: once on a tenure 
track position, he/she is considered as fully socialized and autonomous4. The pre-tenure 
period is not meant to complete an apprenticeship, but to reveal one’s competencies and show 
one’s capacity to earn tenure. Therefore no difference is instituted between the tenured faculty 
and those on tenure track in terms of work allocation. When variations exist among members 
of the same department, they are linked to specific agreements passed with, or to constraints 
imposed by, the academic hierarchy (the chair and the dean). Obtaining an important research 
grant from a national research agency can for instance be a case for less teaching: J. 
Fairweather in the chapter he wrote in this book shows that there is a clear correlation 
between heading a funded research project and spending more time on research and the author 
also mentions the role of administrators in the US in assigning a work load. The institution 
through its academic leaders thus has an impact on the nature and contents of work of 
American academics. 
A third factor influencing the allocation of work is “self-regulation”. Because of their 
specific characteristics, academic activities allow for a high degree of self determination in 
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the organization, allocation and combination of tasks5, even if more constraints weigh on 
them than previously as shown also by J. Fearweather who, in this book, presents a wide 
review of the literature on this trends in different countries. This holds true on status as well 
as when institutions matter, but more in the first case than in the second. When institution 
matters, control over the allocation of work goes along with more incentive mechanisms and 
more control over work performances, as will be argued in the next section. In contrast, when 
status matters, the possibilities for individual “choices6” and for self-determined combination 
are larger: some academics prefer to emphasize teaching while others are more committed to 
research and each adopts their workload and repartition of tasks in terms of their preferences. 
Even when constraints linked to high student pressures or low administrative resources exist 
within a department, some academics feel free to refuse teaching more than required by the 
legal duties or achieving administrative tasks.  
In this first section, it has been argued that the segmentation of academic labor-markets 
has a strong impact on the division of work. It introduces strong distinctions between those on 
permanent or tenure track positions and those belonging to the secondary labor market, whose 
activity consists in precise tasks defined by their direct academic employer. Consequently 
market forces play an important role on the allocation of work in secondary academic labor 
markets. On the primary labor markets, variations in tasks depend in some cases (in the 
United States for instance) on institutional forces. In other cases (such as in France and in 
Germany), it mostly remains in the hand of the academic profession, either at a collective 
level (when differences depend on disciplines or status) or at an individual level (when self-
determination prevails to set the intensity, scope and contents of one’s work).  
 
Control, evaluation and incentives 
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It is usual to speak of faculty members as the “academic profession”. This indirectly 
suggests that the main control processes are in the hand of peers. This capacity of the 
academic profession to self-manage and self-control itself was of central importance in the 
Mertonian analysis of science. From this perspective, the scientific ethos and its shared norms 
(Merton 1957b) play a crucial role and are acquired during a phase of socialization based on a 
master to disciple relationships. The reward systems then guarantees the respect of the ethos 
and acts as a control mechanism. In such a model, there is no place for the market: 
competition for rewards is of course a key (as expressed by Merton (1957a) in a famous paper 
on the “Priorities in scientific discovery”) but is disconnected from market forces, market 
mechanisms or from the pursuit of individual interests. Thus, according to W.O. Hagstrom 
(1965), the Maussian concept of “gift” (Mauss 1923-1924) is more appropriate than the 
market to analyze the mechanisms underlying the scientific production7. If there is no market, 
there is no institution either. This absence of the institutional level in most contributions 
related to the sociology of science further accentuates the prevalent role recognized towards 
the scientific/academic community in self-managing and self-controlling itself. 
But is such a description still relevant today ? Many contributions conclude negatively, 
and often regret, it is no longer the case (if it ever really existed..). Professional control is said 
to be always weaker while institutional control increases. 
Nevertheless, the professional reward system still plays an important role: peers control 
access to the profession, recruitments8 and most career developments, publications in journals 
or books and the attribution of prizes. In the three countries under study, academics are the 
main, if not the sole, actors managing such decisions and they mostly rely on academic 
criteria, that is criteria they considered as relevant. The control led by the peers relies partly 
on organized tests (épreuves) and procedures (recruitments, submission of papers to a journal 
for review,…). Such processes have been often studied9. But peers also exercise continuous 
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and informal evaluation: within a department, during a conference, a visiting scholarship or a 
pos-doc, colleagues proceed to permanent, progressive and non formalized forms of 
assessment that contribute to the construction of their judgments over their colleagues. This 
produces exclusion/inclusion phenomena, selective constitution of networks and discretionary 
proposals for cooperation to some rather than to others. Such processes have been less studied 
despite their potential impact on the contents of academic work, on the allocation of work and 
on careers themselves. They are of particular signification before access to permanent 
positions, i.e. when evaluation is crucial and can not be avoided by those who want to 
undertake an academic career10 (Musselin 1996 and 2000). Thus professional control remains 
strong even if it mostly deals with research and production but it is less equipped (in relevant 
criteria, in assessment processes) for teaching and for administrative responsibilities. 
Nonetheless, the reward system is not only a question of social control, symbolic gains, 
reinforcement of the scientific norms and self-regulation of the profession. It is, and has 
always been, a means to allocate prices of academics, consisting, of course, in symbolic 
rewards, but also work conditions and increases in salary and personal advantages. This price 
is in particular set11 when recruitments occur but important variations are observed from one 
country to another. In some (as in France), the price mainly consists in reputation, salaries 
being fixed according to a bureaucratic non-negotiable scale which is the same for all 
disciplines and all universities. In American universities in contrast, getting a job in another 
institution is a decisive opportunity to obtain a substantial increase in salaries and in working 
conditions. This is also the case in Germany but to a lesser extent because salary negotiations 
are restricted to tenured professors. Nevertheless, negotiations on work conditions may make 
a difference among academics of the same university. The role of market-like mechanisms in 
the regulation of the profession and in its internal differentiation is therefore not to be 
neglected. 
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Finally institutional regulation also impacts on the reward system when forms of control 
and reward are set by “internal labor markets” (Doeringer and Piore 1971), that is incentive 
mechanisms and rules managed by and at the university level. While the professional 
regulation described above is rather comparable in the three countries under study, 
institutional regulation is variously developed from one country to another.  
Internal labor markets are influential in American universities and rely on three main 
mechanisms. First the tenure track process which works as an “up or out” system12: the 
moment when the access to tenure will be under scrutiny is known in advance and the 
decision will lead to maintaining the academic into the university or to firing him/her. This 
decision is prepared by the department and partly relies on evaluations led by peers from 
other universities (through recommendation letters), but this is always completed by 
deliberations at the university level and must be agreed upon by the academic leadership (the 
dean plays an important role in the process). Even if academics are involved in the procedure, 
the charts describing the tenure process in each university highlight that the process does not 
rely on pure academic criteria: institutional dimensions such as the commitment to one’s 
university or the participation in collective tasks are taken into account. Furthermore, when 
tenure is refused, the decision is generally made by a university body or the dean. The second 
incentive mechanism used by American institutions consists in evaluation devices, such as 
teaching records or annual activity reports, which have an impact on salary increase or the 
redefinition of the allocation of work. Finally, after tenure has been obtained, the promotion 
to full professorship s not automatic and can be delayed or even denied.  
Such institutional devices are less developed in German and French universities. In 
Germany, the introduction of merit-salaries13 is recent and before the 2002 act, there was no 
possibility for the universities to reward or sanction their staff. In France, some bonuses were 
introduced by the beginning of the 90s (but they are rather narrowly regulated and do not 
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allow much leeway in each institution) and universities can decide for some promotions. But 
despite these reinforcements of the internal labor markets in these two countries (and in 
European higher education systems in general, Musselin 2003), institutional regulation is 
weaker in these two countries than in the United States. 
In this second section, it has been shown that assessment, control and reward of 
academic work are at the crossroad of three forms of regulation (the organization, the market 
and the profession) but the interplay between them is not a zero-sum game by which increase 
in one forms implies a decrease of the two others: more organizational mechanisms or more 
market forces do not automatically weaken the strength of professional regulation. In the USA 
for instance, the rather developed institutional incentive system does not impede the power of 
the peers, as shown for instance by the dominance of the American journals over the 
international scientific community. The three forms of regulation are thus more cumulative 
than exclusive or substitutive. When the three of them are simultaneously at work they 
combine to increase the overall level of control over academics. As stated by M. Henkel in 
another chapter of this book, this transforms the notion of academic freedom: it is 
nevertheless less because professional power diminishes, but because other forms of controls 
develop in parallel. 
 
Affiliation to a collective entity or what determine academics identities 
 
The specific character of academic work and the low degree of coordination and 
cooperation it requires between faculty members in general, and, by contrast with other work 
situations, between faculty members of the same university raise questions about what ties 
individuals together when they are not linked by strong work interdependencies or what 
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determine academic identities? Are they single players on a competitive market, members of a 
professional group or individuals committed to their institution?  
 
The challenging, classical but complex dilemmas between professional and institutional 
affiliation 
 
For the sociology of science is, belonging to the scientific community constitutes the 
glue among scientists. Academics first of all belong to invisible colleges (Crane 1972, Becher 
1989), within a scientific specialty, or a discipline, which is part of a larger entity, the 
scientific community and its shared norms and values. In such a view, academics are 
independent entrepreneurs linked by the same ethos, the same trust in science, the same 
appetite for truth and competing for discoveries.  
But the distinction established by Gouldner (1957 and 1958) between the cosmopolitans 
and the locals blurs this idealistic image: some academics are strongly committed to skills and 
to external reference groups and are weakly loyal to their institution, while others are not. As 
a result, each group does not invest the same tasks and does not have the same attitude. It can 
therefore be concluded that there exists a link between the contents of work, the type of labor 
markets on which each academic plays and his/her affiliation: hence cosmopolitans spend less 
time in collective activities, are less bureaucratic14 and simultaneously less concerned by the 
internal labor markets (a terminology which was not at hand when Gouldner wrote) governing 
each institution.  
As stressed by O. Kuty (1971) in a stimulating review on the cosmopolitans and locals’ 
issue, two further factors may impact on the behaviors of the professionals. The scope of the 
external labor market constitutes a first factor analyzed in the study led by P. Blau and R. 
Scott (1969). If the market is by and large closed, those committed to professional skills may 
 13 
nevertheless behave as locals, because there are few possibilities for leaving: good examples 
for this are countries such as Norway or Spain where most academics are/were not mobile and 
where few positions were opened for seniors to move. As stressed by B. Glaser (1963), a 
second factor consists in the congruence between the values and objectives shared by the 
professionals and the values and objective of their institution. This explains why highly 
mobile American academics (those called “world class scholars”) may express a strong 
institutional loyalty to their university, until they leave for another and then become 
committed to their new institution. They are cosmopolitans but simultaneously strongly 
affiliated to their university if the latter shares their attachment to professional skills and 
values external reference groups. The influence of organizational saga (Clark 1972) further 
stresses the role of strong institutional identity. A university with a clear strategy, embedded 
in a mythical past and strong values, favors “belief and loyalty15” from its community 
(academics but also the administrative staff, the trustees, the students, their parents…) and 
obtains their commitment to its norms and values. On the contrary, when universities – as 
French institutions until recently16, Musselin 2001/2004 - have weak identity and display low 
congruence, they lack commitment from their faculty members.  
We thus agree with M. Henkel (2000: 22) when she writes it is crucial to take “the 
discipline and the enterprise, (…) as the main institutions or communities within which 
academics construct their identities, values, the knowledge base of their work, their modes of 
working and their self-esteem”. But many different combinations emerged from the interplay 
between these two spheres. In the chapter she wrote for this book, M. Henkel also concludes 
that professional identities are complex and differentiated and this is to expand as variations 
in institutional contexts increase.  
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The various natures of the institutional affiliation 
 
But the strength and the solidity of the link between academics and their institution is 
not the only aspect to take into account; the nature of this relationship has also to be 
understood. Here again diversity prevails from one country to another. 
In the American case, this link is close to the relationship existing between employers 
and wage-earners. This is the consequence as well as the cause for the capacity of institutions 
to develop management devices and to implement incentive mechanisms. This situation finds 
its roots in the history of the American higher education system which first of all relied on its 
institutions rather than on an academic profession (Clark 1983). This is not the case in many 
other countries. In France and Germany, from a legal as from an informal point of view, the 
universities are not the employers, but the Ministry of education in France and the 
Landesministerien (Ministries of Land) in Germany. This situation has an impact on the 
nature of the relationships between each institution and its faculty members. In the French 
case, universities remain “hosting places”, which offer little and therefore can not ask a lot. In 
a few cases, certain French institutions try to change this situation. Some for instance begin 
providing some start-up funds, but this remains quite marginal. In Germany, a rather different 
arrangement exists between the permanent professors and their university. The negotiation of 
material and human resources when recruitments occur, installs an implicit contract by which 
the institution provides the professor with resources allowing him/her to develop his/her 
research while the professor in exchange will participate in the administration of the 
university and show institutional loyalty. But, in the absence of strong internal labor markets, 
this contract can not be redefined if the professor or the university does not respect it. The 
recruitment package works therefore as an investment: the institution “bets” on the professor 
 15 
and expects a return on investment. The recent introduction of merit-salaries can potentially 
alter this arrangement and transform it into a more employer-wage-earner relationship.  
In some other European countries (Austria, United Kingdom,…) more radical attempts 
have been led to introduce managerial practices and transform universities into organizations 
(Brunsson and Sahlin-Anderson 2000, Musselin 2006, Krücken and Maier 2006). Studies 
assessing how far this impacted on academic practices and identities do not all arrive at the 
same conclusions17. It can nevertheless be expected that change in the nature of the links 
between universities and academics – and trends toward employers-employees relationships – 
will affect academic identities but also practices, because it also transforms academic 
activities into academic work. 
To conclude on this third part, it is again important to outline the complex image which 
was drawn due to the variety of combinations which exists. A strong commitment to the 
academic profession can in some cases be associated to a highly competitive and open market 
for positions, in conformity with the traditional figure of the cosmopolitans. But this strong 
professional commitment is also compatible with a strong institutional affiliation if the 
objectives of the university are close to those of the faculty members and/or are embedded in 
a strong and well defined institutional identity. By contrast, two situations limit strong 
professional commitment: first a too narrow external market and second an institutional 
identity which is very different from academic values. In both cases, academics develop 
specific assets increasing their dependence on their institution and precluding their capacity to 
compete on the external labor market. The strength, nature and origin of collective 
commitment among academics therefore helps to identify the conditions by which the market, 
the profession and the institution may become complementary , but also the conditions 
leading to contradictions among them.  
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Conclusion  
 
Four conclusions can be drawn from the preceding four sections. First the strength of 
the market, the profession and the organization varies greatly from one country to another. 
The three national situations mentioned in this chapter offer rather different pictures. In 
France the profession in most cases remains the main, when not the sole, actor intervening on 
academic work and labor markets. The same holds true for Germany, with a nuance 
introduced by the fact that there exists a market for professors in which universities play a 
significant role in setting prices. In the United States, on the contrary, each mechanism can be 
observed and the profession, the market and the institution exercise control over academics in 
a rather cumulative rather than substitutive way.  
 
Second, and consequently, the on-going transformations experienced by academic labor 
markets and work should not be too quickly described as a defeat of professional regulations: 
the expanding institutional or market forces are added and combine in turn, with the 
professional forces. It results in a general increase in control, assessment and management of 
academics.  
 
Third, all kinds of combinations are nevertheless not possible. Some contradictory cases 
have been identified in this paper (for instance the acquisition of specific assets within an 
institution is difficult to conciliate with pure professional norms as well as with confronting 
the market forces) but further reflection will be needed to closely and more precisely look at 
tensions.  
Fourth, the different examples developed in this chapter confirm that academic labor 
markets are articulated with the way academic work is organized. This works in two ways. On 
 17 
the one hand the mechanisms governing academic work and those governing academic labor 
markets are comparable. To put it more concretely: within a given country, when academic 
work is not strongly structured and organized, academic labor markets are not strongly 
structured or organized either. On the other hand, each type of academic labor market is 
linked to a way of conceiving and organizing academic work. Two examples were 
particularly illustrative. First the content of tasks, the nature of the hierarchical relationships 
and the type of employment arrangements attached to the secondary academic labor-market, 
are very different from those that can be observed on the primary academic labor market 
reveals such correspondences: the tasks are more specialized, the hierarchical relationships 
stronger and time-limited contracts is the prevailing employment arrangement on the 
secondary labor market. Second, we saw that the specific attitudes and tasks of academics 
within their institution vary according to the nature of the external academic labor market. 
When they are few possibilities to move from one place to another (when the external labor 
market is not very active), commitment to professional skills (cosmopolitan orientations) may 
combine with  
This last point constitutes a very first step towards a more comprehensive analysis of 
the interplay between academic work and academic labor markets, but certainly opens a 
promising avenue for further comprehensive developments on the academic profession. 
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1  Even if the word “market” is present in the expression “labor market”, the latter can be institution 
driven (when internal labor markets prevail), profession driven (when only peers control the career paths) or 
market driven (when all events on the labor markets result from competition and exchange). 
2  In a few years, it will be interesting to see, what proportion of German academics recruited on the 
newly created Juniorprofessor positions (three year + three year contracts) will be recruited on permanent 
positions and whether those Juniorrofessor positions can be assimilated to tenure-track positions, that is 
positions mostly leading to secured ones. 
3  It is very difficult to produce precise and actualized comparative figures on this point. I estimate that 
in France around 20% of the staff is in the secondary labor market but this is underestimated because it does not 
take into account the time-limited staff working on research contracts or the post-docs ! In Germany, it concerns 
more than the half of the academic staff. In the US, for a discipline like history, and for all kinds of higher 
education institutions, about 15% of the staff are adjunct or part-time, while 85% are either tenured or on tenure 
track positions: they were 14% in 1997. 
4  Nevertheless, department chairs are tenured. But it is less a question of status than a question of career 
constraints. The high achievement in research and teaching required for tenure are not compatible with 
administrative tasks. 
5 This is a stimulating case for economists working with principal-agent theory and interested in applying 
this theory to situations where agents have more than one mission to achieve (cf. for instance, Dewatripont, 
Jewitt and Tirole 2001).  
6  Into brackets because it does not always correspond to free, conscious, rational and autonomous 
decisions from the actors. Circumstances and contextual constraints may be rather influent on the orientations of 
each person.  
7 For Hagstrom, the “gift - counter gift” mechanism is more appropriate than the market for science 
because scientists deliver “professional services”. He points out that “the gift exchange is particularly well-suited 
to social systems in which great reliance is placed on the ability of well-socialized persons to operate 
independently of formal control (Hagstrom, 1965: chapter 1). A.B. Sørensen (1993) also uses this gift exchange 
perspective to analyze academic labor markets. 
8  In our research on hiring processes, it was shown that decisions related to creation/suppression of 
positions and to setting salaries, the peers had limited influence (with important national variations nevertheless) 
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but they have complete control in the three countries under study over the choice and ranking of the candidates 
(Musselin 2002 and 2005). 
9  But rather different conclusions are at hand. For some (Hargens and Hagstrom 1967, Hagstrom and 
Hargens 1968, Cole and Cole 1973), the academic reward system respects the universalist norms and is based on 
the true value of the scientific activity of the candidates. Others, on the contrary, denounced particularist bias: 
according to them, characteristics linked to the evaluated persons, such as his/her mentor, the university where 
s/he studied, the department where s/he promoted or gender are more important than the very value of his/her 
research activity (Crane 1970, Long, Allison and McGinnis 1979, Reskin 1979, Youn and Zelterman 1988, Baldi 
1995, Long and Fox 1995). 
10  Informal assessments may take the form of collective peer review but are also individual for 
instance when a tenured academic produce a judgment on a colleague of the secondary labor market.   
11  On academic labor markets, the determination of the price does not occur when supply and demand 
meet but aftrewards (Musselin 1996 and 2005). Quality (and not the price) is the operator between supply and 
demand on academic labor markets, therefore they can be assimilated to an economics of quality (Karpik 1989) 
where the phase of judgment (assessing the quality of the candidates) precedes the phase of price setting,.  
12  According to economists (O’Flaherty and Siow 1992 and 1995), the “up or out” systems is specific 
for situations where the competences of staff has to be discovered on the job by the principal. 
13  Only a limited part of the salary is merit-based. Furthermore this only concerns newly recruited 
professors, that is all those recruited by a university after the law, whatever their seniority as professor in another 
higher education institutions before.  
14  In the sense that they rely more on discipline-based / professional criteria rather than on formal 
rules.  
15 These are the words used by B. Clark for the title of a first version of this article (Clark 1971). 
16  After more than a century and an half of higher education based on facultés (faculties or schools) 
because universities were suppressed or inexistent, the 1968 law recreated French universities and challenged the 
prima of the facultés. But it is only recently that the newly restructured institutions began developing 
institutional identity and became pertinent actors in the French higher education system. 
17  Some authors stress the influence of these transformations on academics (cf. for instance Slaughter 
and Leslie 1999, Marginson and Considine 2000, Reed 2002). But other authors either show that academic 
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identities rather well resist such influences (Henkel 2000) or that there is no automatic impact and that a variety 
of behaviors and beliefs may be observed (Owen-Smith and Powell 2001). 
